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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Adoptability of Korean PPP Scheme from the Recipient’s Perspective 
By 
 
Jisun Lee 
 
 
 
In trying to have the lessons from the Korean PPP and developing countries’ actual 
circumstances communicated, this paper conducts an online-survey on the adoptability of the 
Korean infrastructure public private partnerships (PPPs) scheme.  This paper traces five root 
constraints in adopting the Korean infrastructure PPP scheme from the recipient’s perspective 
and gives tailored solutions derived from the Korean PPP experiences regarding these constraints.  
It provides policy makers with a road map for making efficient use of ODA to achieve better 
PPPs as well as tangible development that require governance and entrepreneur spirit to tango. 
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 “But I have a bad experience of the PPP project in Bangladesh!”  Mr. Rahman, Ministry of 
Commerce Bangladesh, said during my presentation on the best practices of the Korean 
infrastructure Public Private Partnerships.  I had tried to suggest a developmental policy 
package for the developing countries.  He continued, “We built a toll road that cut the detouring 
road with heavy traffic jam but no one used it, ending up leaving the newly constructed road as 
well as the land devastated”.  The package might have constructed another road that devastates; 
it could have been a destroying tool rather than a developing tool as the lesson Mr. Rahman 
learned from his experience – “It works for you, it doesn’t work for us”.   
Would the lesson turn out to be the same if the project took a different procurement scheme?  Is 
it the PPPs itself which has to take the blame or the institutions and the schemes that to be 
blamed?  Can Korean PPP provide a solution that works for each country, especially 
concerning locality?  If he knew that the Korean PPP can resolve the problem, could he still say 
no to it?    
 
1. Introduction 
According to the World Bank Institute (2011), Governments have employed the Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) for nearly two decades to enhance investment in infrastructure and to 
improve service delivery.  So far, many advanced countries, organizations and institutes have 
published reports on their best practices of the PPP experiences, aiming to share their lessons 
learned with the developing countries.  However, there are little reports that talk about how to 
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make the lessons work for the developing countries (typically, those with tight national budget 
and poor infrastructure systems).   
Caution should be taken in applying the best PPP practices to other countries, considering the 
unique and diverse context for each of them.  The size, nature and maturity of their markets and 
governance conditions vary significantly.  Then, can the best practices of the PPP projects from 
the developed countries work in the developing countries without any alterations; what are the 
constraints in applying the Korean PPP to the developing countries?  Do the recipient countries 
consider their own binding constraints prior to adopting a foreign policy scheme for 
developmental purposes?  This paper claims that there have been little research on the constraints 
recognized by themselves (i.e. the recipients) and there is little effort to remind ourselves (i.e. the 
developers), on the importance of raising awareness prior to applying or taking foreign schemes 
and policies.     
This paper aims to assess the five root constraints in adopting the Korean infrastructure PPP 
scheme from the recipient’s perspective and provides tailored solutions derived from the Korean 
PPP experiences over these constraints.  This research is about how to make the globally proven 
factors of development to work locally, in a practical and realistic manner.  It examines three 
hypotheses: first, recipients are not willing to adopt the Korean PPP scheme without any 
alternation; second, there are at least three significant constraints that people from developing 
countries recognize; and third, recipients’ attitudes toward adopting the Korean PPP scheme will 
be changed when they have a chance to think about the possible constraints they may face.   
The Korean case has been chosen because Korea has successful stories of the PPPs and has 
graduated from the emerging economy; thus, its successful factors of PPPs can be more 
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applicable for the emerging economies’ implementations.  There are publications of the Korean 
PPP that introduce their best practices and lessons learnt; however, few of them care to see if the 
lessons can be applied to the developing countries.  In trying to have the lessons from the Korean 
PPP and developing countries’ actual circumstances communicated, this paper conducts an 
online-survey on the adoptability of the Korean infrastructure PPP scheme.   
This paper is taking the road less traveled by the developed who try to help the developing 
countries.   It reviews the general definition and performance of PPPs in the literature review in 
the following chapter.  In the third chapter, it introduces the Korean PPP with its chronicle 
changes and performances by stages and recognizes six important changes that led to better PPP 
performances.  In the forth chapter, it conducts a survey on the adoptability of the Korean PPP 
scheme to analyze the adaptability of the scheme; and, it also revisits the Korean PPP scheme 
changes to provide a remedy to the survey results.  In providing the answer, this chapter also 
recommends merging PPPs with the Official Development Assistance (ODA).  The fifth chapter 
finalizes this research and concludes with policy recommendations.  
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2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1. Definition of PPP 
OECD (2008) defines PPP as: 
An agreement between the government and one or more private partners (which may include the 
operators and the financers) according to which the private partners deliver the service in such 
a manner that the service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit 
objectives of the private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners.  
 
However there is no standard definition of what constitutes a public-private partnership because 
there are different country definitions of public-private partnerships, OECD (2010).  “Definition 
of PPP isn’t clear in Korean context.  It is because the definition of PPP is different county by 
county” Jay-Hyung Kim, the managing director of PIMAC clarified this during an interview on 
24 June 2011.   
 
In addition, this report finds the advantages and disadvantages of a dedicated PPP unit.  It 
recognizes line ministries/agencies together with the finance/planning ministry have expertise in 
assessing cost-benefits of projects and political prioritization of projects as an argument against 
the dedicated PPP unit.  However, it is important to point out that the argument is not quite 
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persuasive in Korea.  It was when Korea changed decision making process that its PPP 
performance significantly increased. 
Earlier a line ministry used to select projects and conducted a feasibility study on them; however, 
the Ministry of Strategy & Finance decided to conduct Preliminary Feasibility Study by PIMAC, 
which is not easily influenced by politics as an independent evaluation unit for public investment.  
In Korean context, unlike the argument, it was not a matter of expertise but a matter of politics 
and transparency.  
2.2. Principles for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure  
The report published by OECD in 2007 established principles covering five important sets of 
challenges for national authorities in private sector participation in infrastructure, ensuring the 
success of PPP: 
1. Deciding on public or private provision of infrastructure services  
2. Enhancing the enabling institutional environment  
3. Goals, strategies and capacities at all levels  
4. Making the public-private co-operation work  
5. Encouraging responsible business conduct  
It is absolutely understandable that the governments need capital from the private investors; 
therefore, want to involve the private capital through PPP.  However, the PPP does not guarantee 
the success of the infrastructure projects.  It has to be the government who needs to carefully 
look into PPP-ability of the project and the capacities within themselves to carry out the project 
through PPP and deliver the success of the infrastructure project.   
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Korean PPP scheme also possess the mentioned five points.  More precisely speaking, it was not 
until when the Korean government equipped with the points that the government brought 
operational efficiency and notable success of PPPs.    
 
2.3. Successful Case of PPP from the Republic of Korea 
Kim et al. (2011) categorized chronological changes as well as characteristics of Public–Private 
Partnership Financing in Korea.  There are 4 categories: Phase 1 of 1968-1994, Phase 2 of 1994-
1998, Phase 3 of 1999-2004, and Phase 4 of 2005-present.  It focuses to explain the institutional 
arrangement and reform efforts of the Korean government for developing and managing public 
investment programs.  The Korean case demonstrates indirectly the impact of PPPs not only on 
the infrastructure development but also on the whole public investment system, including 
appraisal system. 
Attention is worth noting on the current situation that there is no publication on adoptability of 
PPPs from the recipients’ perspective; neither did the Korean case study suggest the way of 
applying the PPPs to the developing countries.  So, this research has been conducted to find out 
empirical evidences on adoptability of PPPs (scheme) from the recipient’s perspective, thus 
applicability of Korean PPPs to the developing countries.      
 
2.4. Application of PPPs for Developing Countries 
There has been an attempt to make the PPP, which works in Korea, work in the developing 
countries.  KDI PIMAC (2009) studied effectiveness and efficiency of ODA projects in 
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connection with Public Private Partnerships to propose a policy toward maximizing 
participations and active orders in ODA projects from the Korean private sector side.  It also 
reviews ODA-PPP projects in other countries.   
However, it does not examine how to make the linkage between ODA and PPPs, paying little 
attention to the prosperity of the local.  Hence, it leaves a room to elaborate the ODA-ability of 
PPP which will be discussed in the last stage of this paper.    
 
2.5. Fundamental Condition for Development, Entrepreneurship 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) argue that American government and possibly other 
governments in the world should shift its bureaucratic system to result-oriented market, 
highlighting the importance of providing less government but more governance.  They provide 
ten principles that would transform our governments into the better governments that work in 
this era.  
The principles can be traced in the Korean PPP scheme that has been transformed since the 
Korean economy crisis.  However, it is not clear who changed what; that is, if it was the 
government that reformed the Korean PPP scheme or vice versa.  However what is clear is that 
current Korean PPP is more result-oriented and competitive that serves its customer, Korean 
people and businesses.     
R. Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan (2009) warn non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and governments to stay away from running development projects other than helping pro-
business projects.  Many international NGOs have implemented development projects in the 
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form of giving free goods, selling cheap and disturbing local businesses whose competitiveness 
are much weaker than the international big brother.  They persuasively argue that thriving local 
and private businesses are the best hope for the developing countries to end poverty and start 
prosperity.  Finally, they advice rich citizens and companies who desire to contribute themselves 
or feel burdened to do something to the developing world: make a distinction between 
humanitarian and economic aid, and if you want to do the latter, foster local businesses.       
The co-authors argue to challenge the problems of our time and have shown us the direction to 
the development.  The solution is private business.  They enlighten the fundamentals of 
development that is equipping the locals with competitiveness not by giving them free goods but 
by fostering their businesses.   
Although the authors do not say much about how to foster local businesses fundamentally, the 
untaught methodology can be found in PPPs.  Companies, either local or international, build or 
run their business on the basis of social overhead capitals (SOCs) which are built by the 
governments with huge money.  PPPs would allow even a poor government to build the SOCs by 
connecting with private capitals and technologies if the private businesses see a profit from it and 
able to secure their profits.   ODA-ability of PPPs avails this idea.  Is it not only able to guarantee 
revenues to the private firms but also can increase capacity of the local people from policy and 
technical consultations.    
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3. The Korean PPP 
 
3.1. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Korea 
 
3.1.1 PPP Performance 
The Korean government defines a PPP as an initiative that invoices the public and private sectors 
to provide infrastructure and public service (OECD, 2010).  Korea has many successful 
infrastructure PPP projects that have provided public services to people in Korea, reducing 
government’s financial burden and creating long term investment opportunities for the private 
companies who desire high return-high risk business opportunities.   
According to Kim, J.W. 2010, PPP has made contributions to Korean economy resulting from 
input of private capital and the reduced government’s fiscal burden through better Value For 
Money (VFM), and to social welfare resulting from on-time delivery and early realization of 
benefits.  As PPP projects give tangible outcomes, the value of completed project has been 
increased by 25.9 percentages on average over years from 2000 to 2008.  Plus, the construction 
subsidy by the government was much smaller than the private investment in 2008.   
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Box1. The trends of value of completed project,%   
 
Source: PIMAC,2010 
 
Box2. Total PPP Investment by Process Step (as of Dec. 2008)  
 
Source: PIMAC, 2010 
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3.1.2 Chronicle changes in the Korean PPP 
The idea of PPPs was initially conceived in 1960s and has taken effect in 1990s.  Since late 
1990s Korean PPP has been developing with institutional changes.  Kim et al, 2011, explains the 
chronicle changes in Korean PPP projects’ characteristics by stages.   
Box3. Chronicle changes of Korean PPPs Scheme 
 
 
During the phase I, the Korean government conducted PPP projects based on individual laws for 
roads and ports.   
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In phase II, the governemtn set criteria on concession periods, user fees, and government support, 
and specified project implementation processses with revision in the Act on Private Participation 
in Infrastructure, enacted in 1998, to encourage private investment.  The private sector also 
shared the risk as subsidies are provided only when the actual operational revenue is greater than 
50% of the risk-sharing revenue.  Before the revision, the Act on Promotion of Private Capital 
Investment in Social Overhead Capital was enacted during August 1994 to December 1998. 
In spite of the changes designed to promote private investment, the private investment drastically 
declined due to the financial crisis in 1997.  This period was when the government needed more  
private investment to stimulate the economy and more foreign direct investment to improve 
Korea’s sovereign credit rating.  There was even greater need to reinvigorate PPP projects; 
therefore, the governemtn took steps to make a a wide range of systemic improvement. 
In phase III, the government introcued various support systems to reinvigorate private 
investment projects; Marginal Revenue Gurantee (MRG) was introduece for the private investers; 
project promotion patterns were diversified as solicited and unsolicited projects, feasibility and 
appropriateness studies for the selection of projects were required; Korea Infrastrucrue Credit 
Guarantee Fund (ICGF) system was improved; an infrastructure fund was established and 
operated; buyout rights were granted; and Public and Private Infrastructure Investment 
management Center (PIMAC) was estabilished.     
In Phases IV, the government revised the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure, 
expanding the categories of PPP project from economic production facilities to social and 
residential facilities.  During this time, it introduced Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) method in 
January 2005 and diversified the PPP implementation methods.   
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 3.1.3 Institutional reformation of Korean Public Investment Management (PIM) 
Along with the chronicle changes, the overall procedures and systems of the PPP have also been 
amended.  To understand the changes in the Korean PPP system, it is worth to see the Major 
Players in Korea’s Budget Process. 
Box4. Major Players in Korea’s Budget Process 
Players Roles 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MOSF) – the budget ministry 
• Compiles budget bids and prepares the draft budget 
•  Allocates funds to spending ministries 
•  Approves the transfers of funds between line items 
Treasury Bureau of the MOSF • Releases cash to spending ministries 
•  Manages the treasury single account held in the Bank of Korea 
•  Issues treasury bonds and manages assets and liabilities 
•  Collects ministerial financial reports, prepares the whole-of 
government financial reports, and sends them to the BAI 
• Produces the government financial statistics 
Tax and Customs Office of the MOSF • In charge of tax policy 
•  Prepares revenue forecasts 
•  Oversees the National Tax Service and the Customs Service 
Line ministries Execute the budget and prepare financial reports 
Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) • The supreme audit institution in Korea, whose head is nominated 
by and reports to the President.  The National Assembly can also 
request audits on specific issues to the B.A.I. 
•  Checks the regularity of ministerial activities 
•  Prepares and tables the financial report to the National Assembly 
National Assembly • Deliberates and votes on the budget 
•  Approves the transfers of funds between programs 
• Reviews and approves audit reports 
Source: Kim, 2010. Lecture Note. KDI School 
 
  
 14 
 
3.2. Six Effective Changes  
This research recognizes six schemes of revision in institutional settings of PPPs that had been 
introduced through above mentioned phases, mostly in phase 3 and 4. It tries to give the idea of 
each scheme and changes rather than to elaborate upon the structure and performance of the 
scheme.  This chapter acknowledge that it has taken references from Dr. Kim’s memo “What 
Made Public Investment Management Reform Happen in Korea”. 
 
Change 1. Establishment of Dedicated PPP Unit 
As a  statutory organization, Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center 
(PIMAC) was established as a merger of Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea 
(PICKO, 1999) and Public Investment Management Center (PIMA, 2000) by the amendment of 
‘The Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure’ in January 2005. 
An independent review by PIMAC with some help from the policy analysts makes judgement on 
project desirability; PIMAC performs quality control on the Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS), 
Re-Assessment Study of Feasibility (RSF), and Re-Assessment of Demand Forecast (RDF), and 
with policy analysts they explicitly report their independent judgment to budget agency, the 
Korean National Assembly, and the public.  Their judgments, explicitly quantified, are respected 
in most government decision-making.   
Having an independent appraisal institute played a crucial role in developing the PPP 
performance in Korea while some believe that it is not necessary.  They argue that line ministries 
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have capacity to conduct the appraisal; thus an independent PPP unit is unnecessary (OECD, 
2010).  Empirical evidences have shown that the political independency of the institute is the key 
factor of having the institute in Korean context where public projects are strongly influenced by 
politic.      
 
Change 2. Appraisal/Evaluation Scheme for Public Investment Management 
The Ministry of Strategies and Finance (MOSF) monitors expenditures on public investment and 
checks increase in project cost throughout the project cycle through the Total Project Cost 
Management system (TPCM) introduced 1994.  It also invented a tool for prioritizing and 
evaluating public investment, Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS) in 1999.   
PFS is a rather unique feature of the Korean PPP.  The term, PFS, is commonly used in academia 
and many other countries as a general screening work before the PF, whereas Korea 
distinguishes it as an independent legal system that has to be taken through in prior to the PF 
system.  PFS, which is owned by the MOSF but managed by KDI/PIMAC, was stipulated by the 
National Finance Act of 2006 as a legal system.   
Through the PFS, RSF, and RDF, the MOSF has been able to produce its own information more 
reliably than before and they have contributed to the establishment of the public inquiry process 
at line ministries and lower-tier governments, according to Kim, d.n.  With the establishment of a 
legal framework for public investment, the MOSF produces information necessary for decision-
making on budgeting and in-depth program evaluation.  Investigating the projects in detail, new 
devices allowed the MOSF to manage public investment with higher effectiveness.    
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The positive impact on public management by the new schemes is clear.  The request for TPC 
increase in percentage reduced from 26.4% to 4.4% between the time spans during 1996 to 1999 
and 2000 to 2003, respectively. 
Box 5. The implementation Process of Public Investment  
 
Source: Kim, d.n. a mimeo, KDI 
 
Change 3. Change in Decision Making Process 
The new schemes mean not only new initiatives of public investment management, but also 
signify changes in decision making procedures within the fundamental institutions.  Earlier, line 
ministries had conducted feasibility studies to procure government budget for the projects; 32 out 
of 33 projects were evaluated as feasible between 1994 and 1998.  It illustrates that the 
Feasibility Study (FS) team in the line ministries tended to underestimate the project costs and 
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overestimate its benefit, resulting in manipulated higher B/C ratio, polluted by political interest 
groups.   
The government introduced the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) with top-down 
budgeting in 2004.  Before the MTEF, MOSF focused more on the control of inputs and 
budgeted for next single budget year.  However after the MTEF, MOSF paid more attention to 
outputs or outcomes and budgeted for over next five year including the current year.  With the 
establishment of a transparent and clear ownership scheme of the project appraisal and approval 
system, the MOSF provided higher quality information for the decision-making process in 
budget allocation.   
 
Box 6. PFS Procedure  
 
Source: Kim, d.n. a mimeo, KDI 
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Change 4. Government Support: Land Expropriation, Financial and Tax Incentives, 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee (Enactment of the PPI Act, PPP Act) 
1
 
To facilitate infrastructure financing from the private investors, government has enforced various 
policies in favour of them.  The government provided construction subsidy and compensation for 
the base (raw) cost in form of subsidy, infrastructure credit guarantee via the Infrastructure 
Credit Guarantee Fund (ICGF) in form of guarantee system, tax incentives and guidelines for 
early termination.    
 
 Land Expropriation, Financial and Tax Incentives 
In accordance with a law, the government has set a subsidy guideline for the roads of between 20 
to 30%, for the ports of 30 or 40%, and for the railways of up to 50% of subsidy for the total 
project cost as included in the Article 53 in PPP Act and Article 73 in Enforcement Decree. 
PPP Act Article 57 (Reduction and Exemption of Tax) also stipulates that ‘The State or local 
governments may reduce or exempt the taxes to promote private investment under the conditions 
as prescribed by the Restriction of Special Taxation Act and the Local Tax Act’.  In accordance 
with the Act, the government provide tax incentives for infrastructure financing in four 
categories: special taxation, corporate tax, local tax, and exceptions from charges.  Appendix 1 
shows these taxes in details.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 These policies are well explained in details by Kim et al., 2011.   
2
 Yoon, Young-Hoon. 2010. Private Sector Perspective on PPP: Typical issues and experiences for success of PPP project in Korea. 
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 Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
The MRG system is a method for private participants and the government to share the revenue 
forecast risk.  The system and the redemption of excess revenue agreement have a two-part 
structure as they set upper and lower revenue limits.  Through the system and redemption 
agreement, the government provided an operational revenue subsidy until the revision of the PPP 
Basic Plan in October 2009 (Kim et al., 2011).  However, as the history of MRG that was 
abolished in 2009  illustrates, excessive MRG may increase financial burden on the government.   
 
Box 7. MRG 
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 Buy-Out Right 
In addition, a “risk-mitigating factor” for private participants was also recognized.  (Kim et al., 
2011).  The concessionaires of facility can request a local or central government to buy out the 
project and pay the predefined early termination payment in case of that construction or 
management & operation of the facilities are impossible due to circumstances like natural 
disaster.   
 
Exit plan is an assured point of project success in private sector perspective (Yoon, 2010)
2
.  The 
buyout right attracts the private investors to a project by minimizing their financial risk; by 
securing the financial risk on the private parties, the investors’ confident level on the project is 
higher.     
 
Change 5. Setting a safeguard ceiling on government payment 
Note: this paper only considers BTO and BTL procurement schemes. 
The government also internally set up a safeguard ceiling in order to finance its budget for other 
commitments to run the nation.  The ceiling can be allocated based on either Annul government 
payment or PPP investment.  That is either 2% of total government budget expenditure or 10% to 
15% of total public investment. 
 
                                                          
2
 Yoon, Young-Hoon. 2010. Private Sector Perspective on PPP: Typical issues and experiences for success of PPP project in Korea. 
Asia Public-Private Partnership Practitioners’ Network (APN) Training, 8 October 2010, Seoul, Korea  
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Change 6. Procurement schemes:  
• BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) Scheme 
Korea has adopted the BTO scheme whereas many other countries adopt BOT that private 
sectors build and operate the facility for a certain period stated in the concession contract and 
then transfer it to the government.  In Korea context, the national perception of the private 
having ownership of and operating the social overhead capital (SOC) is not friendly because they 
believe that the private companies are after business profits rather than social welfare.  As a 
result, the private company transfers the facility upon completion of construction; then the 
government gives a concession to the private company to operate the facility during the contract 
year.  In this case, the private does not bear a responsible for land requisition and its related tax. 
During the period, the private party is responsible for financing the project and is entitled to 
retain all revenues generated by user-fees, having the facility still owned by the government.  
Both solicited and unsolicited projects are eligible for BTO scheme.  The concessionaire bears 
high risk on demand but still gets high return as they earns as they operate the facilities.  The 
private investor recovers its investment as it receives user-fees, construction subsidy, and MRG.     
User-fees and Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) are available only for solicited projects.  
However the MRG was repealed in 2009 due to heavy burden on the government.  
• BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease) Scheme 
BTL is another form of financing introduced to Korea in addition to the BTO scheme in January 
2005.  Under BTL, a private entity builds a complete project and leases it to the government; the 
government lends and operates the facility for the benefit of its people.  The private company can 
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avoid operational risk while maintain the property rights.  The private investor recovers its 
investment as it receives fixed revenue in the form of lease payment from the government, 
having little demand risk.  Only solicited projects are eligible for BTL scheme to build facilities 
with low risk and low return.     
This procurement scheme is recommended for non-economic facilities such as parks and 
museums.  In general, it is also recommended for the governments whose people have a little 
capacity to afford the user-fees, having the government bear the financial burden.  However, the 
capacity of the government should also be taken into accounts, especially for the developing 
countries whose governments are also poor to subsidize the burden.   
 
3.3. Korean PPP, the showcase of scheme changes  
As mentioned in chapter 2.5. the causation of the changes in Korean PPP scheme as well as of its 
overall public investment management system (PIM) is not clear.  Nevertheless the endeavour 
the Korean government made should be acknowledged for the changes had been made 
throughout years of revisions under the leadership of the government; the changes allowed the 
government to reap the fruits of changes, developed efficiency and transparency in public 
investment, developed infrastructure, and increased foreign investment in Korea. 
The Korean PPP scheme has been and is evolving.  The Korean government adopted policies 
that seemed to work in Korea and abolished policies that were not working in Korea to attract 
foreign investors and to achieve developed Korean infrastructure PPP.  For instance, the 
internationally accepted procurement scheme had to change its term from BOT to BTO, 
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reflecting the Korean market psychology.  Moreover, the MRG, which had attracted the foreign 
investors, was abolished resulted from the harsh criticism on the financial risk of the government.     
The Korean PPP scheme had made substantial contributions to developing infrastructure in 
Korea.  It might and/or might not work in other countries, especially the developing ones.  
However, the process of the scheme changes can give practical lessons to the countries willing to 
develop their infrastructure PPP as well as public investment system.   
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4. Data and Findings 
4.1. Survey 
The empirical evidences from the previous chapter proved that the changes have increased 
operation efficiencies within the government, levels of social welfare, and business opportunities 
as well as profits for the investors.  Then, can we apply the transformed Korean infrastructure 
PPP scheme directly to the developing countries without any alterations?    
Objectives 
In trying to have the lessons from the Korean PPP are communicated and to find out potential 
barriers for the Korean PPPs to be replicable, an online-survey on adoptability of the Korean 
infrastructure PPP was conducted with sample size of 103 from 25 July 2011 to 3 September, 
2011
3
.   
 
Sample 
The sample was randomly selected among KDI School students and alumni from the developing 
countries.  KDI School’s international students were targeted firstly because they have working 
experiences in either public or private sector with majority of the government sector; secondly, 
they have knowledge of both the home country and Korea.  Note to be taken that the sample may 
contain potential biases toward “Korea” elements; the respondents have or had been supported 
with scholarship by Korean companies and agencies; thus, their reliability to Korea is relatively 
high.       
                                                          
3
 Initially, invitations were sent to 475 people but only 103 responded during the period 
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4.1.1 Design 
After providing the participants with background information on Korean PPP scheme changes, 
the survey asks 10 questions on PPP and 4 questions on personal information.  The survey 
consists with 6 blocks: 1 - Background information, 2 - Personal information, 3 - Awareness of 
the general PPPs, 4 - Awareness of the Korean PPP and of adopting foreign scheme, 5 - 
Awareness and recognition of root constraints in respondents’ country, and 6 - Change of 
perception on adopting Korean scheme. 
The background information is given in the first section prior to questionnaires to provide the 
participants with an idea of Korean PPP scheme and to examine the first hypothesis.  It does not 
provide in-depth schemes but simply listed out the key changes in Korean PPP scheme.  The 
information is designed to be brief because in reality a PPP host country may not know the 
scheme in-depth; authorities of the country may be forced to make a decision under the 
circumstance.  See Appendix 2-survey.    
In Block 2, respondents are asked to provide their personal information including their affiliation, 
which will provide values to their answers as it shows their direct or indirect experiences in 
public investment, including PPPs.  In Block 3-6, the respondents are asked to provide their 
views on PPPs.  Especially, a question on willingness to adopt Korean PPP is asked twice: in 
Block 4 and in Block 6. 
The Block 4 is designed to ask the question to prove hypothesis 1: recipients do not think the 
Korean PPP can be applied without any alternation.  This hypothesis will be concluded to be true 
if more than 90% of participants reject adopting in the first stage.  The Block 6 is designed to 
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repeat the same question to confirm if there is a change in respondents’ perception on adopting a 
foreign policy scheme when they see and realize the possible constraints in their countries in the 
course of answering Block 5.  The block 6 is designed to result in proving hypothesis 3, 
recipients’ attitude toward adopting the Korean PPP will be changed when they have a chance to 
think about possible constraints their country have.  
In Block 5, respondents are asked to score the level of constraints on a scale of 1 to 5 to prove 
hypothesis 2: at least three constraints are significant among the listed twelve constraints.  The 
constraint is considered to be significant if the average scale on each constraint exceeded 3.0.  
Combining words and numbers in a 5-point rating scale with 1 being weak constraint provides 
clarity of the answers, in accordance with a question in Block 3 on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being 
very satisfied.  The scale options have negative values on higher numbers.  
To ensure the respondents are aware of the difference between the countries settings and of 
potential barriers, twelve root constraints are given in Block 4.  An open-end questionnaire on 
further constraints is also provided to capture what has not been able to be listed and to have the 
respondents concerned on the constraints in their country.   
 
4.1.2 Analysis 
This paper excludes any possibility of regression between the PPP satisfactory level (Block 3 - 
question 2) and constraints (Block 5 - question1) because the values scored by the respondents 
were very much qualitative and inconsistent over questionnaires.  Instead, it analyzes the survey 
through 2 stages, total response and screened response. 
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Twelve potential root constraints were given to the respondents to level the seriousness of each 
constraint in their countries context.  The factors were grouped into four categories, Public 
Governance, Government Capacity, Financial Constraints and Human resources.  But the 
categories were concealed to the respondents to have them focused on the level of each factor. 
In result, both the total and screened responses, the government capacity was considered to be 
the most significant constraints with an average score of 3.21 to 3.23 out of 5.00 and public 
governance with an average score of 3.34 to 3.39.  Financial constraints and human resources 
were recognized as insignificant constraints compare to the mentioned ones.   
 
 Initial stage: total response 
Among the 103 respondents 83% of them have heard about PPPs in general.  As 37% of them 
thought that the Korean PPP scheme would work in their countries without any alteration, the 
first hypothesis is rejected, concluding recipient will adopt the Korean PPP scheme without any 
alteration.  Their willingness to adopt the scheme as it is was decreased by 2 % when they were 
asked again after having them thoroughly considered given the constraints.    
Within the groups, Bureaucratic hurdles, High corruption in the public sector, Poor leadership of 
political institutions, Weak institutional capacity within the government, and Lack of financial 
resources within the government were recognized as significant and ranked one to five, 
respectively.  
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 Second stage: screened response 
To capture more valuable data from the survey, responses were screened with criteria of a 
minimum level of knowledge in PPPs and working experiences of 5.2 years on average in either 
public or private sector.  Fifty respondents were selected from the previous stage, consisting of 
the respondents from 76% of the government sector and 24% of the private sector.      
Among the 103 respondents 36% of them thought the Korean PPP scheme would work in their 
countries without any alteration and their willingness to adopt the scheme without alteration was 
increased to 50% after considering the potential constraints, rejecting the two hypotheses 1 and 3.  
This increasing pattern was consistent both in the government sector from 18% to 37% and in the 
private sector from 17% to 33%.   
49% 
6% 
14% 
2% 
27% 
<Table 1> Sectoral composition of sample 
Central government 
Local government 
Government Agency 
Government Agency - 
PPP Unit 
Private Firm 
Public Sector: 73% 
Private Sector: 27% 
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This can be attributed to their knowledge of effectiveness of PPPs in infrastructure developing 
and their ability to recognize development of PPP schemes in the Korean scheme.  Nevertheless, 
the increasing pattern shows that the respondents neglect to cautiously compare their country 
settings to the Korean ones.         
However, the increasing pattern on the willingness does not indicate that Korea can go ahead 
apply the scheme.  50% of those who were willing to adopt even without alteration did recognize 
that there will be hindrances due to different context of countries; they commented that it is 
important to the acknowledge the difference in political and economic contexts and to improve 
ex-ante appraisal capacity in the open-end questionnaire.   
 Among the given constraints, there were six constraints recognized as significant in screened 
responses: Bureaucratic hurdles, Poor leadership of political institutions, High corruption in the 
public sector, Weak institutional capacity within the government, Lack of financial resources 
with the government, and Poor human resource capability within the government, ranking one to 
six, respectively.   
 
<Table 2> Survey result: root constraints 
Constraints (Strongest to weak) 
Total Response *Screened Response 
Average Rank Average Rank 
B. Public Governance 3.3916 1
st
 
3.3537 1
st
 
5.Bureaucratic hurdles 
   (Red tapism, long official procedure, etc.) 
3.6796 1 
3.6200 1 
6. High corruption in the public sector 3.5049 2 
3.5200 3 
4.Incentive Mechanism for private partners 
   (Tax intensives, other grants, etc.) 
2.9903 6 
2.8600 7 
A. Government Capacity 3.2136 2
nd
 
3.2585 2
nd
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3.Poor leadership of political institutions 3.4660 3 
3.5600 2 
1.Weak institutional capacity within the government 3.2427 4 
3.2600 4 
2.Poor human resource capability within the government 2.9320 7 
3.0200 6 
C. Financial Constraints 2.7314 3
rd
 
2.7211 3
rd
 
7. Lack of financial resources with the government 3.2330 5 
3.2600 5 
8. Poor economy health of the country 2.7864 8 
2.7800 9 
9. Unwillingness to allow foreign labours to the country 
    (work force) 
2.1748 11 
2.0200 12 
D. Human Resources 2.3657 4
th
 
2.4014 4
th
 
12. Lack of technical human capital in the economy 2.7282 9 
2.8200 8 
10. Low education in the country (High illiteracy) 2.2524 10 
2.2600 10 
11. Less human capital (Less work force in the country) 2.1165 12 
2.0400 11 
*Screened response: 50 respondents who have heard about PPPs before were selected out of 103.      
  
Comparing these outcomes to the result from the previous stage, the screened respondents gave 
more weight on poor leadership of political institutions than the corruption in the public sector 
and poor human resource capability within the government. 
 
4.1.3 Hypotheses Testing Summary  
 Hypothesis 1: recipients do not think the Korean PPP scheme can be applied without any 
alternation in their countries. 
37% of general and 34% of screened respondents thought the scheme would work without any 
alteration in their countries, rejecting the hypothesis.  Only about 65% of people do not think the 
Korean PPP scheme can be applied directly.  This result implies potential indiscretion that the 
host countries’ policy makers have in the adoption of foreign policies.  
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 Hypothesis 2: at least three constraints are significant among the listed twelve constraints.   
The general respondents recognized five and the screened recognized six constraints as 
significant as they could hinder adopting the Korean PPP scheme to their countries, not rejecting 
the hypothesis.  Both the two groups identified bureaucratic hurdles, poor leadership of political 
institutions, high corruption in the public sector, weak institutional capacity within the 
government, and lack of financial resources with the government.  Additionally, the factor of 
poor human resource capability within the government was also identified as significant by the 
screened respondents.  
 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
<Table 3> Level of Constraints 
*Screened Respondence Total Respondence 
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 Hypothesis 3: recipients’ attitude toward adopting the Korean PPP will be changed when they 
have a chance to think about possible constraints their country have.  
The hypothesis was proved to be true as the two groups changed their perception on adopting the 
Korean PPP and the percentage changes were greater once the constraints removed.  However, 
the direction of the change was different between the groups toward adopting the scheme without 
alteration.     
Among the general 37% respondents who thought the Korean PPP scheme can be applied as it is 
to their countries, 2% of them negatively changed their perception as the percentage was reduced 
to 35% as a result of consideration on their own root constraints in adopting the scheme.  
However, 88% of total respondents answered that they are willing to adopt the Korean scheme 
when the constraints are removed.    
Unlike the general, the screened respondents’ perception on directly applying the Korean PPP 
scheme was increased from 34% to 50% even after having concerned their own constraints.  As 
the general respondents answered, 88% of screened ones also answered that they are willing to 
adopt the Korean scheme once the constraints are removed.   
 
4.2. Empirical evidences from the Korean PPP 
The constraints recognized in this survey seem quite general as they can also be the ones for 
development.  Yet, the results gave this study still a hope; a hope that the recipient country can 
achieve development when the constraints become insignificant.  Empirical evidences from the 
Korean PPP scheme show that the major constraints the survey addressed are curable.      
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This empirical study does not overlook the importance of governance as the first priority to 
achieve development for a country.  It rather tackles the issues within the developing country 
governments in attempt to provide a map to achieve good governance.      
 
4.2.1 Corruption and Institutional Capacity Issues 
Corruption is caused when there is little transparency, in order words asymmetry of information 
between the public and private or amongst authorities, in the course of project planning and 
implementation.  Empirical evidences from the Korean PPP scheme show that the attempt to 
commit corruption is declined when cross-ministerial task force systems are implemented as the 
change 2 and 3 explained in Chapter 3.   
The system allows both the planning party and the spending party to have symmetric information 
on a project as the two parties conduct separate project appraisal on the project.  Now the 
ownership of appraisal is not only in the line ministries who conduct FS to procure government 
budgets for the projects, but also in the budget ministry who conducts PFS prior to the FS.  It 
follows that the project passing rate was over 90%
4
 before the PFS was invented but the rate has 
been reduced to 60.5% from 1999 to 2010 when the PFS has been in act.       
 
4.2.2 Bureaucracy  
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its 
purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed 
                                                          
4
 During 1994 to 1998, 32 out of total 33 large-scale projects were evaluated as feasible in main feasibility studies conducted 
during the period. 
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bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine 
with the non-mechanical modes of production.  Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge 
of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of 
material and personal costs- these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly 
bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. 
- Max Weber 
Whereas bureaucracy developed in a slower-paced society, we live in an era of breathtaking 
change.  Whereas bureaucracy developed in a hierarchy that only those at the top of the pyramid 
had enough information to make informed decisions and focused on inputs to avoid corruption, 
we live in an era of participatory politics and of outcomes.  “We live in the environment that 
demands institutions that are extremely flexible and adaptable and that deliver high-quality 
goods and services, squeezing ever more bang out of every buck and that empower citizens 
rather than simply serving them” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).   
In general, PPPs molds an administrative government into an entrepreneur government that 
deliver high-quality goods and services to the citizens, focusing on outcomes.  The government 
secures necessary financial resources for an infrastructure projects from the private funding and 
encourages private competitions through an open bid to achieve the best services from the 
private sectors for public welfare.  The evidence is easy to be found in the Korean PPP scheme.  
The Korean government tries to maximize the services with the better quality; it opens solicited 
project as well as unsolicited project, allowing chances of unrealized project to be recognized.  
This is also related to the constraint – poor leadership of political institutions in the Section 4.2.4.  
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The Korean PPP scheme also provide a degree of answer to the bureaucracy issue because its 
focal point had been retargeted from the input to the outcomes when the MOSF introduced 
MTEP and top-down budgeting.  When reviewing the ministerial budget requests, MOSF now 
places less emphasis on the microscopic control of line items and more on the strategic 
alignment of budget requests with overall policy directions to deliver the outcome.  See Change 
3 in the Chapter 3.2.     
The top-down budgeting might be regarded as a bureaucratic system.  It could be it; it could be 
even more bureaucratic by the definition defined by Weber in a positive way.  Indeed, it has led 
the line ministries to be more transparent and efficient in budgeting for they no longer need to 
exaggerate their budget plan unrealistically; previously, they had no information on how much 
they are going to be allocated with, so they needed to overstate their project costs in order for 
them to secure their budget for the projects. 
    
4.2.3 Capacity within the government  
As the Change 1 in Chapter 3.2 illustrates, Korean PIM system introduced the independent PPP 
units, PIMAC.  By entrusting project appraisal and evaluation that require expertise, the demand 
on sophisticated capacity within the government to process the work is now being transferred to 
PIMAC, which is capable of conducting the most complicated and integrated appraisal and 
evaluation.  Now, higher quality of projects are being proposed and managed with higher 
standards.  Plus, the good projects can be secured by the independent appraisal and evaluation 
conducted by independent unit, which is literally independent from political power.    
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4.2.4 Poor leadership of political institutions 
It is important to have good leadership in a country.  Good leadership provides what is needed 
for the people, listens to what has been raised by the people, and tries to increase the integrated 
welfare of the people.  In that sense, it is equally important to have a good system that can allow 
a third party to initiate a project, which in turn increase the welfare of the people, especially 
when there is poor leadership in the political institutions.   
The Korean PPP scheme allows both solicited and unsolicited projects.  By allowing an 
unsolicited project, the system helps initiating a good project which was failed to be recognized 
by the government.  Thus, the government leadership can reduce the gap between what the 
government has provided and what people need not by their initiatives but by the system.   
Nevertheless, it is true that the government should evolve by itself to attract the investors, 
building mutual trust.  As the Korean PPP scheme changes show, a level of government supports 
should also be guaranteed financially and politically.  On one hand, the fanatical guarantee can 
be given to the investors in the form of tax incentives and so forth.   On the other hand, the 
political guarantee should also be given from the planning stage with government buy-in that 
will be continued to the next government.  
 
4.2.5 A lack of financial resources with the government  
As a lack of financial resources has been an inveterate constraint for the development of a 
country, it is also a constraint for doing PPPs even with a well developed PPP scheme.  
Unfortunately, the Korean PPP scheme cannot solve this issue; therefore, there is a need to set up 
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a new paradigm that can secure both finance and development within the Korean PPP scheme to 
make it adaptable to the environment of developing countries.  The new tool that could solve the 
financial issue will be discussed in the next part.    
 
4.3. Resolution: Infrastructure PPP+ODA 
Lighten up the burden 
Speaking of the importance of infrastructure in developing countries is obsolete.  What has been 
less shared is the way of bring an opportunity to build the infrastructure.   As discussed PPPs 
provide a key to bring the opportunity; it is an effective procurement tool for infrastructure 
development especially when the government has insufficient funds. The PPPs contributes to 
achieving better welfare for the people and more business opportunities for the companies and 
less government financial burden.   
Consideration should be made; with PPPs the fiscal burden of government to carry out an 
infrastructure PPP project is less, not zero; the financial burden is still there and still heavy for 
the developing country governments to carry out.  The government tries to secure their budget 
for the PPP project and when their budget is still not sufficient they sell out their endowments by 
giving concessions for their natural resources to a foreign investor in exchange for the PPP 
project.   However, this exchange seems sceptical in terms of B/C for the countries with the 
endowments; as a matter of fact, the long-term cost on the governments looks bigger due to their 
forgone profits from selling when time is right.  Thus, an alternative is demanded.  
ODA-able PPP: hard infrastructure and soft infrastructure 
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In doing PPPs, the government burden can be lightened by ODA in “DAC-able” countries those 
are not a member of Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  The government can secure its 
funds for making payments to the investors and supporting the investors with incentives by using 
money from Official Development Assistance (ODA).   
Merging the PPPs and ODA can benefit the three: the developing countries, the private investors 
and the developed countries, especially the DAC members.  It could allow the developing 
countries to attract the private investors; it could allow the private investors to make profits; it 
could allow the DAC members to achieve their ODA goals, altogether contributing global 
development.   
Empirical evidences say that ODA can be just another type of aid that weakens recipients’ 
immune system to self-sustain (Moyo, 2009).  Against the criticism, the sustainability issue can 
be treated if the ODA is used concurrently for building both hard infrastructure and soft 
infrastructure.  PPPs and ODA interact; ODA can provide seed money for PPPs and PPPs will 
provide SOCs, foundation for businesses and better standard of living.     
 
4.3.1 ODA Grant for soft infrastructure  
ODA grant can strengthen both the structures for PPPs in policy perspective and the capacity of 
human capital in project perspective.  Especially for those countries that are in the early stage of 
development, ODA should be given in the form of grant throughout ex-ante, implementation, 
and ex-post stages.  See Table 4. Methodology for implementing a PPP project with ODA.   
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In ex-ante stage, the developing country government will face a lack of appraisal structure in 
their PIM and encounter with some codes that are needed to be revised or to be built to achieve 
higher level of development, including that of infrastructure.  To conduct assessment on the 
structure to be strengthened, the government need money for hiring the expertise. To review lists 
of domestic legislation subject to amendment, the government needs money for hiring the 
expertise.  ODA can be utilized in carrying out the PIM assessment and legislation review.   
In implementation stage, once the projects are approved, implementation from design to 
maintenance is in the private investors’ hand.  Therefore it is necessary for the government or the 
government agency for PPPs to be equipped with appraisal and evaluation ability to conduct 
feasibility study, to oversee the implementation that is many times carried out by the 
international companies and to monitor the outcomes.  To amplify their ability, their capacity 
should be built and strengthened though education and training such as consensus building, 
capacity building and sector specific workshop programmes.  And the programmes can be 
subsidized by ODA grant in non-monetary form.  
PPPs policies or structural changes and capacity can be thoroughly strengthened with ODA grant 
in the form of forums, workshops or consultancy services that can make direct impact on PPPs, 
not in a monetary form that can be utilized elsewhere as the empirical evidences taught us.  As it 
strengthens the grantee, it becomes an attractive market for commercial business; then, in near 
future, it will open up a favourable climate for commercial business activities also for the granter 
in return, as the two now share similar business environment.   
Nonetheless, it is worth to mention that the grant should be untied.  The reason is simple.  ODA 
should be given first for the development of the recipient countries and their people by the 
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definition of aid.  As a whole it is true that the public money should be spent for the development 
of the people of a donor country as well.  But priority matters.  No one is that naïve in this 
millennium, believing aid should solely benefit the recipient countries.  ODA should be a 
strategic tool for development in the globe; nevertheless ODA, more generally aid, should not be 
degraded as a business tool but be maintained as a development tool, giving the ownership to the 
recipients.         
 
4.3.2 ODA Loan for hard infrastructure 
Long-term ODA loans can secure the developing country governments with financial resources 
for attracting investors.  The government can utilize the ODA loans in three ways: project 
payments, tax incentives and interest rates.    
On the one hand, the ODA loan can provide the government with direct financial support in 
making leasing fees to the private investors for BTL projects.  While most BTL projects are 
known for museums and schools, the BTL projects are comprehensively interpreted here – they 
cover highways.  Some people might criticize applying BTL for a highway project without a toll 
using BTO, saying that the users are not the poorest of the poor.  However, they should be 
reminded that some countries do not even have the paved road which people can take as an 
alternative to the toll.   
Let’s suppose the highway without an alternative has a toll that is operated by the private 
company.  The company can charge the high fee, holding a monopoly of the only paved road.  
The fee will not necessarily be as high as the one private company charges if the toll is operated 
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by the government.  By operating the highway, the government will also learn how to make 
profits for repaying the loans, keeping their people’s burden small.     
On the other hand, With ODA loans the government provide subsidy for introducing tax 
intensives and for supporting financial institutions to offer better interest rates for the investors.  
As Korean PPP illustrates, the various forms of government support build trust in investing PPP 
projects because they secure financial risks on the investors.  The loan will allow the government 
to provide investment friendly environment for the private investors who participate in PPP 
projects.  
 
<Table 4> Methodology for implementing a PPP project with ODA 
 
* Blue bars: Provided ODA in due course 
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5. Conclusions 
Policy Recommendations for the Korean Policy Makers  
The PPPs are one of the best ways for building infrastructure and their best outcomes can be 
delivered only through a well designed and executed PPP scheme as the Korean PPP history 
shows.  Nevertheless, consideration should be made on the survey result.  Forty percent of the 
total participants do not question much whether the Korean PPP scheme would fit into their 
countries’ context while the definition of PPP differs country by country.   
The 40% of respondents might endanger their countries to face a heap of debt by taking PPPs 
while neglecting their capacities to carry out PPPs and ignoring the differences between their 
countries’ setting and that of Korea.  Therefore, it is important for Korea to raise awareness of its 
PPP scheme, which can strengthen the developing countries’ soft infrastructure, and to set up a 
tool for self assessment as well as a program for consensus building prior to apply the scheme.    
  
The empirical study on the Korean PPP scheme in Chapter 4 discovered a map in itself that treats 
the binding constraints in adopting the Korean PPP as well as in achieving development in the 
developing countries.  However, the map can be realized only by the merging Korean PPP, 
which includes its scheme, and ODA, which secures financial support.  Unlike the traditional 
aids, the combination of the Korean PPP and the ODA can reduce inefficiency of the aids as 
PPPs inject an entrepreneur spirit into the public sectors.   
In the course of carrying out the infrastructure PPP projects which are supported by the Korean 
PPP scheme and ODA, the government of the host country will face internal reformation and 
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learn entrepreneur spirit throughout the competitive stages to deliver the best outcomes, to meet 
the basic needs of their people and to provide improved public services to their people.  This will 
lead to increase in foreign investments.   
Besides the foreign investments, domestic businesses will also find broadened opportunities 
domestically as well as internationally as they now have developed infrastructure that links the 
region to another region and to other countries.  With entrepreneur spirit, they will make the next 
step to development by themselves, repaying the ODA.  Plus, it will open up an attractive market 
for the foreign countries, bringing prosperity to the host country as well as to the globe. 
 
Policy Recommendations for Policy Schemes of the Korean PPP and ODA 
The Korean infrastructure PPP scheme can lead the developing countries out to sustainable 
development through the infrastructure PPPs when it utilizes ODA, achieving her ODA goal that 
is set by 2015.  Likewise, the developing countries can achieve successful infrastructure PPPs 
with ODA as they can attract investment capital for the infrastructure PPP projects, equipping 
themselves with capacity to monitor and to evaluate the projects.  Hence, the Korean scheme is 
recommended to adopt the merged version of the PPPs with ODA to deliver the outcome, 
prosperity, demanded by Korea and the recipients.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Special Taxation for Public–Private Partnership Projects 
Type Contents 
Infrastructure 
Bond  
The concessionaire and other parties may issue an infrastructure bond for 
implementing PPP projects. A separate tax rate of 14% is applied 
to the interest revenue from such bonds with 15 years of maturity or 
more (such application has been extended through 31 December 2009: 
Article 29 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act). 
 
Value-Added Tax A 0% tax rate is applied for the value-added tax for infrastructure facilities 
or construction services of such facilities provided to the central or local 
governments pursuant to Article 4 Subparagraph 1 (build–transfer–
operate), Subparagraph 2 (build–transfer–lease) and Subparagraph 3 
(build–operate–transfer) of the PPP Act or for construction services with 
the purpose that the concessionaire under Article 2 Subparagraph 7 intends 
to operate a project that is charged with the value-added tax (such 
application has been extended through 31 December 2009: Article 105 
Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3-2 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act). 
A 0% tax rate is applied for the value-added tax charged on urban railway 
construction work provided directly to the concessionaire under Article 2 
Subparagraph 7 of the PPP Act (such application has been extended 
through 31 December 2009: Article 105 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 of the 
Restriction of Special Taxation Act). 
 
Foreign 
Investment Zone 
 
Reduction of an exemption from taxes, including corporate tax, income 
tax, acquisition tax, registration tax, and property tax, are applied to foreign 
investment of $10 million in newly established private investment facilities 
in the Foreign Investment Zone (Article 116 Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 3-
3(e) of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act). 
 
Infrastructure 
Fund 
For the dividend income distributed for the infrastructure fund, a 5% 
tax rate is applied to the dividend income from the equity investment 
portion up to W300 million and a 14% tax rate is applied to the dividend 
income from the equity investment portion exceeding W300 million 
(such application has been extended through 31 December 2009; Article 
91-4 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act; Article 129 Paragraph 1 
Subparagraph 2 of the Income Tax Act). 
 
Source: Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Income Tax Act, Republic of Korea 
 
1. Type 
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Corporate Tax for Public–Private Partnership Projects 
Type Contents 
Infrastructure 
Credit 
Guarantee 
Fund (ICGF) 
 
The bad debt allowance for redeemable liabilities of the ICGF pursuant to 
the PPP Act is categorized as an expense (Article 63 of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Corporate Tax Act). 
When the ICGF accepts the bad debt allowance for redeemable liabilities 
as an expense, the amount is included as an expense in the process 
of calculating earnings for the year within the range of 1/100 of the 
remaining amount of the credit guarantee as of the end of the business 
year (Article 63 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 and Paragraph 2 of the 
Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act). 
Way of 
Calculating 
Earnings 
 
When used to 
grant subsidy 
 
When a domestic corporation uses granted subsidy 
for the purpose of acquisition or reform of business 
assets with an aim to carry out PPP projects, 
the amount pursuant to such use is included as 
expense in the process of calculating earnings of 
the year (Article 64 Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 6 
Subparagraph 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the 
Corporate Tax Act). 
For 
concessionaire 
 
When the concessionaire distributes as dividend 
90% or more of the distributable income by meeting 
the terms of a nominal investment company as 
stipulated under Article 51-2 of the Corporate 
Tax Act (the equity capital of the concessionaire 
corporation for the projects other than build– 
transfer–lease projects shall be W5 billion or 
more and the equity capital of the concessionaire 
corporation for the BTL projects shall be W1 billion 
or more), that amount is deducted when calculating 
earnings (Article 51-2 of the Corporate Tax Act; 
Article 86-2 Paragraph 4 Subparagraph 1 of the 
Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act). 
Taxes on Land 
 
Land developed for the implementation of PPP projects is exempted from 
additional taxation of capital gains tax and corporate tax (Article 55-2 
Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 and Paragraph 2 Subparagraph 4(c) of 
the Corporate Tax Act; Article 92 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 of the 
Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act). 
Source: Corporate Tax Act, Republic of Korea 
2.  Contents 
3.  
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Local Tax Exemptions in Public–Private Partnership Projects 
Type Contents 
Exemption of 
three times the 
registration tax 
 
An exception of three times the registration tax applies to newly 
established corporations incorporated within the capital region (which 
includes the city of Seoul and Kyonggi Province) for the implementation 
of a PPP project (Article 138 Paragraph 1 of the Local Tax Act; Article 101 
Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax 
Act). 
 
Exemption from 
acquisition and 
registration tax 
 
Build–operate–transfer projects are exempt from acquisition tax and 
registration tax on real estate (Article 106 and Article 126 Paragraph 2 of 
the Local Tax Act). 
 
Source: Local Tax Act, Republic of Korea 
4.  
5.  
6.  
Exception from Charges for Public–Private Partnership Projects 
Type Contents 
Exception from 
charges 
 
50% of the farmland preservation charge and substitute afforestation 
charge are exempted for each facility (Article 57 of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Farmland Act, and Article 24-2 of the Enforcement Decree of 
the Forest Act). 
 
Source: Farmland Act and Forest Act, Republic of Korea 
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